

Power and Politics in America

Recitation 1: Analytical Tools for the Study of Politics/Models of Cooperation and Defection

LAP (ch.1), PPA, (sect. 1-2), Osbourne (pp.1-19, 21-29)

Logistics [10 min]:

introduce yourself

students: name, one interesting thing

talk about recitation handout (participation, grading, etc.)

Terms [Put on board, ask if clear to everyone, 5 min]:

Rationality (Osbourne)

Collective Action (Slides, LAP, PPA)

Coordination Games (Slides, LAP, Osbourne)

Prisoner's Dilemma (Slides, LAP, Osbourne)

Free-Riding (LAP)

Tragedy of the Commons (LAP, PPA)

Transaction Costs (LAP)

Conformity Costs (LAP)

optional: Private Goods, Public Goods, Externalities (LAP)

Analytical Tools for the Study of Politics [Ask for explanation of concepts, 10 min]:

Models

- **stylizations that approximate a real situation**
- usefulness determined by insight into phenomena of interest gained (e.g. a 2-D map is helpful in getting directions so it does not need to be closer to reality)
- models are not supposed to perfectly reflect reality, they never do, but should enlighten us regarding the question asked.
- rationality: a rational choice is one which is deemed by the actor to be at least as good, according to her preferences, as every other available action (Osbourne, p.6)

Collective Action

- politics deals with implementing, regulating, initiating, agreeing upon collective actions
- **collection action problems arise b/c individuals have incentive to deviate from a plan of action actually benefitting the group as a whole** (e.g. global warming, police, national defense, etc.)
- many institutional forms of solving collective action problems (regimes: democracies, autocracies, dictatorships; political systems: parliamentary, presidential; laws; norms)
- **institutions are rules or organizations**
- associated problems: free-riding, tragedy of the commons, transaction costs, conformity costs

Models of Cooperation and Defection [45 min]:

Students are asked to identify which model they encounter, prisoners' dilemma or coordination game. Give them the three games below and ask first, **what type of game do we see here?** Then go on and elaborate on each game.

- **Prisoners Dilemma** (model of contrary interests)

		Player 2	
		<i>R</i>	<i>L</i>
Player 1	<i>U</i>	2, 2	0, 3
	<i>D</i>	3, 0	1, 1

- go over components of strategic game:
 - actors
 - actions (simultaneously)
 - preferences over the set of action profiles
 - payoffs (in normal form games they usually only carry ordinal interpretation of preference orderings; in a strategic game with ordinal preference orderings specifying a payoff function is not necessary)
 - * standard notation (e.g. placement of row and column player).
- ask a student to come up with and explain dominant strategies (strategy makes player better off no matter what opponent does), best responses and equilibria of the model. make them to go through it exactly and as Pat did in class, ensure that they are able to solve such a game by themselves.
- talk about Nash (set of strategies that are mutual best responses), optimality of equilibrium (Pareto)

- **Coordination game** (model of aligned interests)

- go over components of the game (actors, actions, payoffs, strategies) and notation.

		Player 2	
		<i>R</i>	<i>L</i>
Player 1	<i>U</i>	1, 1	-1, -1
	<i>D</i>	-1, -1	1, 1

- ask a student to come up with and explain dominant strategies (strategy makes player better off no matter what opponent does), best responses and equilibria of the model.
- ask student to differentiate coordination games from prisoners' dilemma. what institutions are needed to implement pareto-optimal equilibria in coordination games, in prisoner's dilemma? coordination game: institutions setting initial standards but self-enforcing afterwards (ask for examples: driving on the right side of the road, official languages, domain-names?!?), prisoners dilemma: institutions constantly monitoring and enforcing optimal behavior (ask for examples: obey red light, taxation, emission filtering, etc.).

• **Battle of the Sexes** (model of partially aligned interests)

		Player 2	
		<i>R</i>	<i>L</i>
Player 1	<i>U</i>	2, 1	0, 0
	<i>D</i>	0, 0	1, 2

- go over components of the game (actors, actions, payoffs, strategies) and notation.
- ask a student to come up with and explain dominant strategies (strategy makes player better off no matter what opponent does), best responses and equilibria of the model.

Trivia [100 years]: Sweden is not a socialist country but a capitalist market economy based on private property and has a well established representative democracy. the standard of living according to the human development index in Sweden (number 7) is higher than in the U.S. (number 13) and Sweden scores best in almost all indicators of disease prevention and treatment (cancer, alzheimer's, etc.). however, Sweden only spends 8% of its GDP on health care but gets almost the best care existent in the World. Furthermore, Volvo is not bankrupt (that would be every U.S. car maker except Ford)...tststs...ignorant.

More illustrating examples [in the after-life]:

- Problem 1: For lack of a better solution to disposing of their industrial waste, the only two companies in a small town have been dumping that waste in a local pond. Suddenly, the fish in the pond have three eyes. The companies are concerned about the public relations nightmare that three-eyed fish will cause them. Each values a clean pond (and two-eyed fish) at 20 dollars. The total cost of cleaning the pond is 30 dollars. If they both work together to clean the pond, they will split the cost equally between them. If only one of them cleans, that company will bear all of the cost, but the pond will get cleaned and both companies will avoid the public relations nightmare. You should be able to set up the payoff matrix for the game and

predict the outcome given each company's decision to clean the pond. In addition, you should be able to state if (and why) this is an example of a prisoner's dilemma or, rather, a coordination game.

- Problem 2: Basically, think of the tractor scene in Footloose: Two high school students in an extremely religious Midwestern town apparently have nothing better to do than play chicken with tractors. Each player "speeds" his tractor at the other player. If one player swerves and the other player does not, the player that swerved is chicken and the one that went straight is BMOC. The worst outcome would be if neither player swerves: tractors go boom, and Kevin Bacon and the other nameless 80s actor die. The best outcome for an individual player would be to go straight and the other player to swerve (i.e., to be BMOC). Both players could both swerve, in which case nothing is lost but nothing is gained (making for a somewhat boring movie scene). Let's say that a collision has a payoff of negative 100 (i.e., -100). Being BMOC is worth 10. The humiliation of being chicken is worth negative 10 (i.e., -10), but if both players swerve, the payoff is 0 for both. Okay, set up this 2x2 matrix and solve. Are there any dominant strategies? Are there any Nash equilibria? If so, what are they? Does this look more like a coordination game or prisoner dilemma? What makes it unique? After you have solved for the equilibria in this game, think about what would happen to the game if one of the players could commit to driving straight prior to starting?

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Recitation 2: The Constitution/Comparing Regimes/Review for Midterm #1
LAP (ch.2), PPA (sect. 2-1), Litwack/Jordan (ch.7), TAA (preface)

Logistics [10 min]:

remind students about midterm #1 (on 02-11-10)

thursday/friday sections: do review

Terms [Put on board, ask if clear to everyone, 10 min]:

Logrolling

Checks and Balances

Nation: Collective identity generally rooted on particular geographic location.

State: Highest political authority over specified land area with a permanent population; entails a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its borders and the ability to conduct diplomatic relations with other states.

Regime: particular configuration of governing principles and institutions that prevail within a particular state. Most regimes are legitimized through a written constitution.

Government (non-US): incumbents of a particular regime (what in the US, we would call an administration)/Government (US): Entire multipart structure established under the Constitution.

Questions:

- Is the U.S a nation?
- Are the Jewish people a nation or religion or both?
- If a rebel group controls part of a country (i.e. as in Colombia and Taliban in parts of Afghanistan) and taxes the people, polices the people, and provides services is it a state?....depends on your definition (Weber yes, others no, because of no external sovereignty).
- Talk about the riots in the French banlieu and the recent headscarf debate and what it means to be French i.e. France as a nation or nation state (collective identity).
- If a country has a Constitution, but it is constantly ignored by the politician, is the Constitution the Regime? Think about the recent Constitutional Crisis between Zelaya and Micheletti in Honduras.

Institutions [15 min]:

1. Electoral System: Majoritarian vs. Proportional Systems

- **Question:** How are all federal and state public officials elected in the U.S.?
Answer: Majoritarian plurality electoral system in single member districts (also called first past the post).
- **Question:** How could you do it differently?
Answer: Other Majoritarian electoral systems (used for single offices (e.g. Presidents) but also for legislative elections (e.g. parliaments)):
 - Selecting candidates for more than one seat/office = larger district magnitude; more votes are given to each voter, candidates are ranked according to votes received and seats up for election filled)
 - Alternative voting/instant run-off: Voter indicate their top preference, second preference etc. First preference votes are counted, the two (or whatever many seats need to be filled) candidates receiving the most votes selected, first preferences votes not going for the two are re-counted looking at the next preferences indicated by voters (e.g. Australia, Ireland, San Francisco!).
 - Two round run-off: Candidate with majority of vote wins. If no candidate wins a majority, the two receiver of the most votes advance to the next round. Candidate with majority wins in second round (e.g. presidential election in France).

Or Proportional System (used for legislature/parliamentary elections only):

Politicians run for office usually organized in parties. Parties receive seats proportional to the number of votes. Usually parties need to pass a threshold of percentage of votes received (5 - 10 per cent). Voters vote for an open or closed party list. In an open party list election, voters can rank the candidates nominated by a party, in a closed party list voters can only give their vote for the party in total.

Of course, there is no single perfect system but ...

Majoritarian/plurality systems give **clearer** options to choose from to voters and are more **efficient** in establishing a majority hold by one political group (party systems tend to 2-3 parties only, voters tend not to vote for third parties (strategic voting), produces so called closed party systems since new parties are hard to establish and if the government responsibility switches it does so completely from one grouping to the other). Majoritarian systems are critiqued for not giving any influence to the votes cast for the losing party/candidate and thus make the system not representative and dominated by the majority ideology, ethnicity, etc. (Examples: U.S., U.K.)

Proportional systems are more **representative** and produces open multi-party systems usually with coalition governments. Proportional systems are said to be less efficient in producing majorities for the selection of the chief executive or legislation (almost all parliamentary systems except the UK!!!!, e.g.

Netherlands, Israel, Italy; Germany has a mixture of proportional and plurality system) .

Majoritarian systems might be more **stable** because of clear majorities but proportional systems might be more **stable** because of the representation of all societal groups. In new democracies a hard decision has to be made to balance the need for reform and fast decision-making and the representation of all stake-holders.

2. Selection of Chief Executive: Presidential vs. Parliamentary System ... and France

- **Question:** How is it done in the U.S.?

Answer: Directly election via electoral college. Chief executive (the President) then picks his cabinet and gets it confirmed by Congress. The President is head of state (representative figure head) and head of government (actual head of executive, boss, big bear...). That is called a **presidential system**.

Question: How could you do it differently?

Answer:

- **Parliamentary systems:** Elect a parliament, the parliamentary majority (party or coalition of parties) then votes upon a chief executive called prime minister, chancellor, president (yes it's true, they do so in Spain) who picks his cabinet. The prime minister is the actual head of the executive, the boss, the head of government but there is also usually a head of state (representative figure head called e.g. president (yes, in Germany), Queen, king, etc.). Examples are UK, Germany, Netherlands, Israel, Spain, Scandinavian countries.
- **Mixed systems:** Directly elected president **and** a by parliament selected prime minister. The president has some actual decision-making powers but less than a President in pure presidential systems (e.g. France).

Presidential systems might be more **representative** (directly elected head of government), more **stable** through stricter separation of powers, but less **efficient** (gridlock). Parliamentary systems might be more **representative** through broader coalition government, more **efficient** since head of government always has majority to make legislation but less **stable** since coalition break and smaller, probably more extreme parties are in parliament as well.

3. Legislative Procedure

Question: Where are laws drafted and negotiated?

Answers: In committees and the bureaucracy (so called working parliament, e.g. U.S., Germany).

Question: How could you do it differently?

Answer: Laws are exclusively written by the bureaucracy, committees don't even exist (so called debate parliament, e.g. UK)

4. Supreme Court

Question: Who checks if the laws made are in accordance with the constitution in the U.S.?

Answers: Supreme Court does judicial review as court of last resort (you need to go through all courts before, there needs to be an actual case, SC does not take action if nobody complains about an action, similar in Germany).

Question: How could you do it differently?

Answer: Laws are checked while being negotiated in parliament by a constitutional court (e.g. France), no court of last resort in conflicts around the constitution exists (e.g. UK, selected members of the upper chamber, however, act as a review body).

Given what you have heard about other forms of government around the world, what would you change in the US Constitution if you could?

Constitutional Design: Founding Fathers vs. Founding Bush [Refer to original proposals on Blackboard, 20 min]:

After Saddam Hussein was removed as Iraq's leader in 2003, the Bush administration installed a transitional government, which was centered on a central authority in Baghdad. In the aftermath of this transition; however, there was significant civil strife in Iraq, which sparked an international debate as to how the new Iraqi government should operate.

At the center of this debate were two competing plans; one put forward by then senator Joseph Biden and president of the Council of Foreign Relations Leslie Gelb; and another by the Iraq Study Group, lead by former secretary of state James Baker and Lee Hamilton.

Table 1: **Competing Plans for Iraq**

Biden/Gelb Plan

Baker/Hamilton Plan

Decentralized government, promoted as federalism.

Strong central government, promoted as bottom-up approach to governing.

Three regional governments, divided roughly on religious lines among Sunni (Central-West), Shiite (South-East) and Kurdish (North). Most of the country's oil is concentrated in the North, central government responsible for common.

Central government contains a bicameral legislature (Council of Representatives and Council of Union), executive (President and several cabinet minister) and a judiciary (hierarchical court system).

Each regional government responsible for their own domestic laws, administration and internal security.

Council of Representatives of Iraq (lower) has 275 members elected for four years, with two sessions in each annual term. Council of Union (upper) has yet to be [something missing here?]

Weak central government responsible for common concerns such as protecting borders and distributing oil revenue.

Iraqi central government should maintain tight control over the nation's oil revenues.

Good: to entice Sunni minority to join government by allowing them to govern themselves.

Good: sought to dismantle militias through proactive national reconciliation.

Bad: Difficult to convince Kurds to share oil profits given geographic advantage.

Bad: Sunni minority has little say in government, vast corruption within government agencies.

Questions:

What, if any, similarities/dissimilarities are there to these plans and those put forth at the Constitutional Convention (VA vs. NJ plans)?

Likewise, what issues were germane to the Iraq debate that were not to the U.S, and are there any parallels?

In class debate: how might you propose a compromise of these two views, borrowing from lessons learned in the Connecticut Compromise?

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Recitation 3: Putting Federalism into Comparative Perspective/Review for Midterm #1

LAP (ch.3), PPA (sect. 3-2), Peterson (ch. 2/3), TAA (ch. 3/4)

Logistics [10 min]:

remind students about midterm #1 (on 02-11-10)

thursday/friday sections: do review

Terms [Put on board, ask if clear to everyone, 10 min]:

Federalism

Functional Theory

Great Compromise

Geographic Preference Heterogeneity

Tiebout sorting equilibrium

Federalism [30 min]:

- separate them into groups of 4-5 and ask for ways to describe and evaluate federalism
- let one group present and add suggestions of other groups on the board; they should come up with the following:
 - **Federalism** is the division of authority between two or more distinct levels of government; it is a mix of elements of a confederation and of an unitary government. Federalism comes in the form of **dual** or **shared** federalism.
 - **Categories** to analyze federalism as political institution are **efficiency** in enacting policies, **representativeness** and **responsiveness** of political institutions, **stability** of the federation, the nation as a single entity
- separate them again into two groups and ask to evaluate a dual federalist system (group 1) and a unitarian system (group 2) along the lines of the categories up on the board; arguments like the following should come up
 - federalism is more efficient in enacting policies since it supports flexible, well adjusted solutions and policy innovation but slows down decision-making on the federal level
 - unitarian systems are more efficient in policy areas requiring large-scale solutions, i.e. large infrastructure projects (interstate system), national defense (Washington's call for men and arms), taxation (avoiding tax competition; Delaware), education standards (see Peterson p. 43)

- federalism increases the size of the bureaucracy since more institutions in each branch of government needs to be set-up
- unitarian systems increase the size of the bureaucracy since centralized agencies need to solve many small-scale problems and enforce rules even far away from the capital city
- federalism has more levels of representative bodies and is due to its closeness to the citizen more responsive and thus at the end more democratic
- unitarian systems enable a national identity and can encounter e.g. tribal conflicts (important to new democracies) and thus stabilize a democratic regime.

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Recitation 4: American Political Culture

PPA (sect. 10-1), TAA (ch. 11), Pew Research Center

Terms [Put on board, ask if clear to everyone, 10 min]:

Public opinion

Political culture

“liberal” vs. liberal, “conservative” vs. conservative

population

sample

causal effect vs. selection effect

American Political Culture [Short Review of Lecture; 10 min]:

- What is political culture? Could be many things; talk about political attitudes, values, orientations; commonly shared paradigms about politics, society, economy, moral. Some also include behavior and not just attitudes.
- What is considered to influence the American political culture? Political culture at the origins of the nation, reinforced through successive waves of immigration.
- What are the main feature of this political culture? Self-reliance, religiosity, tolerance of diversity. Still true today? Why? How could these features survive over time?

Survey Research [Aim is to explain what surveys can or cannot show; 55 min]:

1. **Start with a simple demonstration [10 min]:** Ask four different questions anonymously on a sheet of paper, two of those questions are directed each towards two groups in class. The aim of this exercise is to demonstrate the effects of wording and other problems of survey design and presentation. Students should not communicate during the exercise. One part of the class is asked:

- Do you think Don't ask, don't tell should be repealed? (Yes or no answer only)
- Do you think aid should be provided to those in need? (Yes or no answer only)

The other part of the class is asked:

- Should homosexuals be allowed to openly serve in the military? (Yes or no answer)
- Should the government fund welfare policies? (Yes or no answer)

Collect the sheets and make one student count results, put them on the board. Ask them how knowledge affected their decision. Did they know what “Don’t Ask, don’t tell” means? Ask them how they think about the words “homosexual” vs “gay” or “welfare” vs “aid”. Do those terms carry different meanings? Do they carry different meanings for different people?

2. **Can we believe polls [30 min]**? Present Pat’s claim that Americans are for their wealth unusually individualistic? How to encounter such interpretation of a poll? Draw the graph having all non-democracies vertically aligned on the left side of the plot individualist vs income and the advanced democracies in an increasing line from bottom left to top right (U.S.).

- What is the evidence supporting the claim made?
- What is the wording of the question? What questions did Pat present us? Does it ask for what it is supposed to ask for? Does the question for attitudes towards government interference carry the notion of individualistic we are looking for? Does it reflect hatred towards suppression in non-democracies but political conservatism based on efficiency concerns in advanced democracies? Or another example: Does the question “Do you support school prayer?” asks for an opinion on the freedom of religion or on the execution of organized praying? Look at results in PAA, p. 466; attitudes towards the invasion in Iraq changed with the use of the words “approve”, “agree”, and “yes”!!!
- What are the response alternatives? It matters if we allow Hispanics to call themselves Whites as well or if Hispanic and Whites are exclusive categories.
- How are don’t knows handled?
- Are there different interpretations of the same data possible? Re-visit Pat’s example on individualism vs income. His graph shows a positive relation of individualism and income for advanced democracies but a negative one for non-democracies. However, he looked at the regression line overall and found an overall negative trend yielding the U.S. as outlier.

3. **How to conduct a scientifically solid poll [20 min]**? Ask students for ideas how to figure out what the income distribution is in the U.S. What people think about abortion? What people think about playing the Super Bowl on Christmas Eve?...

- What is the population I am interested in? All Americans, students, single mothers?
- Since I cannot get every individual’s opinion, what would be a representative sample of the population of interest? Can I get a representative sample of the income distribution in the U.S. if I go to the next Airport and collect data randomly picking passengers?
- What wording, order of questions, how many questions, areas of questions, channel of questioning (phone, mail, email, face-to-face) should I use? Ask students for problems arising from technical aspects like using a phone, email, online-surveys? Where might be bias.

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Recitation 8: Agenda Setter/ Polarization and Centralization/ Congress

LAP (ch. 6), Shepsle/Bonchek (ch. 5), PPA (sect. 6-1. 6-2)

A. Terms [Put on board, ask if clear to everyone, 10 min]:

Agenda control

Agenda setter

Status quo

Median

Reversion point

Partisanship

Committee

Incumbent

Gerrymandering

B. Congressional Organization [just a short review of basic knowledge? do we want to do that? 5 min]:

- How does a bill become a law?
- What is the role of committees? Are they agenda setter?
- Why is partisanship/polarization a problem? What's a veto, what's a filibuster?

C. Agenda setter model [go through some of the exercises on the sheet attached, 30 min]:

- Make sure they know the decision rule for the agenda setter to call a vote ($|q - s| > |m - s|$ where q is the status quo, m the median, and s the setters ideal point)
- For the agenda setter to make a proposal
 - If $s < q < m$, BR of setter is $p \leq q$, p loses and q remains law
 - If $q < s < m$, BR of setter is $p = s$, p wins and s becomes law
 - If $q < m < s$, BR of setter is $\min(s, m + |m - q| - \epsilon)$, p wins and $\min(s, m + |m - q| - \epsilon)$ becomes law.

- Do exercises

D. Polarization and Centralization [Divide in two groups, 30 min]:

First of all, how do we know that there is polarization in Congress? Look at Roll-call voting behavior (PPA, p.214/240-41, Poole/Rosenthal (2007), Bartels (2008)), filibuster and cloture votes (PPA, p.218), unanimous party votes (PPA, p.239). Let one group make a case why polarization and decision-making centralization is ok, let one group make a case why it is bad.

Arguments why it is bad (see PPA (sect. 6-1. 6-2))?

- Gridlock: No reform.
- Abuse of congressional procedures by majority (see reconciliation) and minority party (see filibuster, blockage of administrative nominees); speakers in both chambers make policy and do not preside sessions (is that really bad?)
- Flow of power from Congress to the president
- Negative public view of Congress, low turnout?

Arguments why it is good?

- Gridlock: No tyranny.
- Congress is responding/reflecting to polarization in public (normative argument, responsiveness is good)
- More coherent parties means easier identifiable ideological labels; more information provided to public/voters
- System becomes more accountable and transparent (normative argument) since responsibilities are more clearly assigned and misbehavior/scandals more often made public by the opposition

Power and Politics in America
Recitation 9: Pivotal Politics/ Presidency
LAP (ch. 7), Skowronek (ch. 3), Krehbiel (ch. 2)

A. Terms [Put on board, ask if clear to everyone, 10 min]:

Institutional presidency

Executive order, executive privileges

Unitary executive

Pivots

Presidential veto

Filibuster

Supermajority

Gridlock: Absence of policy change in equilibrium in spite of the existence of a legislative majority that favors change

B. Agenda setter model [15 min]:

I'll do another agenda setter model exercise.

C. Presidency [15 min]:

Discuss

- Historical presidency. Not that important position.
- Nowadays: Imperial presidency? Unitary executive doctrine. Why did the presidency gain importance to being the main legislation initiator where his approval is needed? Complexity of society? How did he do it?
- Talk about institution: Unitary executive. Commander in chief, head of state, chief executive. That is a weird combination of representative office with over-partisan appeal and hard-core power.
- Today's tasks of a president: bureaucrat, legislator, strategist.

D. Introduce pivotal politics model [30 min]:

Model Set-Up

- Uni-dimensional policy space, status quo policy q , president, n legislators, preferences are symmetric and single-peaked (explain on board, draw)

- Supermajorities required to enact laws: veto- and filibuster procedures (let a student draw the policy space with pivotal legislators for a conservative president)
- Sequence of play: Congress adopts bill, Filibuster or not, President signs or vetos, Congress overrides or sustains; let a student replicate figure 2.3 (p.24 in Krehbiel) and indicate where gridlock can occur.
- What is gridlock? See definition in terms. In the model gridlock is any outcome where the pivotal player chooses the status quo over the proposed policy. Why might that be a disappointment for the public, perceived as injustice? Except when $q=m$, there will be a majority favoring p but is stuck with q .
- Who is the pivot? Go through 2-3 cases mentioned in the book starting p. 28.
- Make students put up the generalization of gridlock cases on the board (figure 2.7, p.35). What are the lessons? Gridlock occurs often but not always. Winning coalitions are usually large and bipartisan.

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Recitation 10: Pivotal Politics/ Presidency

LAP (ch. 9), TAA (ch. 7), PPA (sect. 5-3, 9-1, 9-2)

A. Terms [Put on board, ask if clear to everyone, 10 min]:

Judicial Review

Writ of Mandamus, Marbury vs. Madison

United States vs. Nixon

Roe vs. Wade

Bush vs. Gore

District courts, courts of appeals, SC

judicial doctrine

B. Pivotal Politics Model [Hand out exercise sheet, 15 min]:

Split up in groups of 2-3, let them do the exercise and call students from different groups to the front to put the solution on the board.

C. Federal Judiciary [45 min]:

What role should the federal judiciary play?

- Mediator, referee? Should it represent the middle of the spectrum?
- How are judges and prosecutors recruited? Reversed veto procedure.
- Is the SC a politicized actor (partisans in robes, Bush vs. Gore)? Should it be? Is it a political actor?
- What powers does the SC has, legislature or executive do not have? Legislature has the power of the “purse” whereas the executive has the power of the “sword” (PPA, p.107). Is it judicial review? Is the judiciary an equal power?
- If we want the judiciary to be **impartial**, who does that benefit? Those who can afford a good lawyer (PPA, p.10)! If you want to make judges **independent** from other branches how can you do that? Public election. What does that do to judicial behavior?
- Should the SC recognize rights not explicitly protected by the constitution? See Roe vs. Wade. **Do group exercise on that one**; Split the class up into four camps. Legislature, Pro-Life, Pro-Choice, Judiciary. Students should prepare a speech making arguments why their position should be heard (constitutional right? normative argument? democratic responsiveness? etc.) and how such a decision should be

institutionalized? Or should it not be institutionalized? Arguments should rest on the student's knowledge about powers assigned by the constitution, conflict about this assignment, public opinion/good democracy-arguments.

- Should the judiciary rule “originalistic” (Scalia)? Is a original reading of the constitution possible? That is also called textualistic.
- Should the judiciary be progressive (Beyer)? Emphasis on statutory purpose and congressional intent? That is called teleological.

By the way, civil law does not imply narrow rulings as PPA asserts (p.111) since all laws written by legislature are largely open to interpretation. Throughout Europe, courts play an important and independent role in interpreting laws and thus creating cases of precedence similar to the process in case law countries.

Power and Politics in America
 Recitation 11: Bivariate/Multivariate Analysis

A. Terms [Put on board, ask if clear to everyone, 10 min]:

Bivariate, Multivariate Analysis

Regression Line

B. Quantitative Analysis [60 min]:


1. Bivariate Regression:

- Let's think about the relation of income and ideology. Here are a couple of values (i, income in thousand \$, score on ideological scale (1 left, 11 right)):

	income	ideology	
1.	15	3	
2.	60	9	
3.	40	9	
4.	40	4	
5.	25	4	
6.	100	10	
7.	90	7	
8.	30	5	

- How do we usually describe a relation between two variables. Say we want to know how ideology changes with income. What is the y here, what is the x? Answer is $y = a + b * x$. What is a, what is b?
- Make them aware that no x and y correspond exactly in the way the regression analysis had estimated. It is only a general summary of the relationship between the independent and the dependent variables. Thus, we can even make a prediction about people not in the data. So it is $\hat{y} = \hat{a} + \hat{b} * x + e$. What does that mean?
- Make one student put the points on the board and draw the regression line and the errors. Indicate a, b, e. (see figure 1).
- Make them guess the look of the equation. It's $estimated\ ideology = 3.10 + .065 * income$. What does that tell us? 3.10 is the average value of the dependent variable when the independent variable is 0, .065 is the average change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable.
- Here is also the full regression result.

Figure 1: income vs ideology



Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	28.4548872	1	28.4548872	Number of obs =	8	
Residual	23.4201128	6	3.90335213	F(1, 6) =	7.29	
				Prob > F =	0.0356	
				R-squared =	0.5485	
				Adj R-squared =	0.4733	
				Root MSE =	1.9757	
Total	51.875	7	7.41071429			

ideology	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
income	.0654135	.0242275	2.70	0.036	.0061311	.124696
_cons	3.104323	1.398336	2.22	0.068	-.3172825	6.525929

- We know that we are slightly off with our estimate since we do not have a sample of all Americans but just 8 dudes. What is the relation between b and \hat{b} ? How sure can we be that \hat{b} is a good estimate? How is \hat{b} determined? Its

$$\hat{b} = Cov(x, y) / Var(x)Var(y)$$

- What is R^2 ? Start with Total sum of squares = Regression Sum of Squares + Error Sum of Squares? Where does this come from? It describes the variance in our scatter plot; point it out. $R^2 =$ Regression Sum of Squares/Total Sum of Squares; it is the explained variance.

2. Multiple Regression:

- Why? Look at this Cross-Tab (table 2) and let students fill the empty cells.
- Consider the example of income and ideology again. What should we add to get a better representation? Maybe religiosity? Here is the data:

income	ideology	religion

Figure 2: More than one covariate important?

In January 1971 the Gallup poll asked: "A proposal has been made in Congress to require the U.S. government to bring home all U.S. troops before the end of this year. Would you like to have your congressman vote for or against this proposal?"

Guess the results, for respondents in each education category, and fill out this table (the two numbers in each column should add up to 100%):

	Adults with:			Total adults
	Grade school education	High school education	College education	
% for withdrawal of U.S. troops (doves)				73%
% against withdrawal of U.S. troops (hawks)				27%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

1.	15	3	2
2.	60	9	6
3.	40	9	10
4.	40	4	3
5.	25	4	2
6.	100	10	5
7.	90	7	4
8.	30	5	6

- What is your guess is the story here? More religious people are more conservative even if not high enough income. Look at in bivariate case, see figure 3
- How can we represent such a multivariate relationship? $y = a + b_1 * x_1 + b_2 x_2$
How do we estimate it? $\hat{y} = \hat{a} + \hat{b}_1 * x + \hat{b}_2 x_2 + e$. What is our estimate for a person with ideology 8 and religion 1? Here is the full regression result.

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 8		
Model	46.2301343	2	23.1150672	F(2, 5) =	20.47	
Residual	5.64486567	5	1.12897313	Prob > F =	0.0039	
				R-squared =	0.8912	
				Adj R-squared =	0.8477	
				Root MSE =	1.0625	
ideology	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
income	.0562622	.0132321	4.25	0.008	.0222479	.0902765
religion	.6085611	.1533692	3.97	0.011	.214313	1.002809
_cons	.6712227	.9703339	0.69	0.520	-1.8231	3.165545

- How do we do with explained variance? How certain are we about these results?
- What happens with nonlinearity? Make up an example with a variable where ideology is not linear related to ideology. Draw such a curve on the board. Ask if we still could use linear regression? Ask for suggestions what to do; just give them an idea of nonlinear models? Talk briefly about what it means to do parametric estimation. Talk about sample size, size of errors, interpretative mistakes, the assumption of normality in errors etc. Do not overwhelm here.

Figure 3: ideology vs religion

